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K. A. Friedmann* The Ombudsman in Nova
Scotia and Newfoundland
The Ombudsman is a relative newcomer to Canadian provincial
government.' The senior Canadian Ombudsman offices are located
in Alberta and New Brunswick, both ten years old. The Nova Scotia
Ombudsman has functioned for six years, and Newfoundland's
Parliamentary Commissioner for a mere two years. It may therefore
be too early to analyze their degree of institutionalization. The
concept does enable us, however, to focus our attention on the most
important questions regarding the early history of the Ombudsman
institution in the Maritimes.
According to S. P. Huntingdon, 2 institutionalization may be
resolved into two internal components, complexity and coherence,
and two external components, autonomy and adaptability. The two
most important external actors which affect the emergent
Ombudsman institution are politicians, who created the office, and
civil servants, who are the Ombudsman's main targets. This paper
examines the attitudes and behaviour of politicians and civil
servants to see whether in fact the Ombudsman is becoming
institutionalized in these provinces.
Although the Ombudsman is a significant innovation in the
provincial context, 3 it should not be regarded as a panacea. The
*K. A. Friedmann, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,
University o Calgary. This comment was prepared for presentation at the Annual
Meeting of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, October 21, 1977. The material presented in this paper is part of a larger
comparison of all eight provincial Ombudsman offices. The survey data used here
were collected with the assistance of a grant from the Institute of Public
Administration of Canada. My earlier studies on the Ombudsman were also
supported by Canada Council grants. Both grant supports are gratefully
acknowledged.
1. The literature on the Ombudsman is expanding at a rapid pace. The earliest
summary on Canadian developments appeared before the first Ombudsman: S. V.
Anderson, Canadian Ombudsman Proposals (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental
Studies, University of California, 1966). Other major books on the subject are: W.
Gellhorn, Ombudsmen and Others. Citizens' Protectors in Nine Countries
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); D. C. Rowat, The
Ombudsman: Citizens' Defender (2d ed. London: Allen & Unwin, 1968); L. B.
Hill, The Model Ombudsman: Institutionalizing New Zealand's Democratic
Experiment (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976)
2. S. P. Huntingdon, "Political Development and Political Decay" (1965), 17
World Politics 404
3. The Ombudsman was included in a recent study of provincial legislative
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paper's second focus is therefore on the public policy question,
"what kind of institution is the Ombudsman?" What are the
functions of an Ombudsman, in terms of policy intent and an
incumbent's role interpretation and role enactment? What impact
does the organization have on policies, procedures and the
provincial political system as a whole? Can one detect any changes
in the citizen's liaison with the bureaucracy? To what degree has the
Ombudsman improved the citizen's ability to cope with bureauc-
racy?
I am deliberately raising more questions than I can hope to
answer in this paper. I am presently engaged in a detailed study of
the Ombudsman's policy impact, but cannot yet present my
conclusions. I was able to measure public attitudes toward the new
office only in Alberta, mainly for financial reasons. 4 1 did attempt to
measure clients' perceptions and attitudes toward the Ombudsman,
but was unable to secure the necessary cooperation of the
Ombudsmen themselves. I did manage, however, to obtain
government permission to survey the two provinces' bureaucracies
and I also completed a survey of MLAs' views on the Ombudsman
in both provinces.
I must forego close examination of how institutional innovation
occurs in Atlantic Canada, which would require thorough study of
the political culture's receptiveness to innovation. In order to place
the politicians' and civil servants' attitudes in context, I will outline
the politics of adoption of the Ombudsman proposal and milestones
in its subsequent development.
One aspect of political culture should be mentioned. Mildred A.
Schwartz has found that party regularity in voting in Canada
decreases from east to west. 5 Party identification and conflict tend
to be more pronounced in the Atlantic provinces, 6 a view confirmed
innovation: Dale H. Poel, "The Diffusion of Legislation among the Canadian
Provinces: A Statistical Analysis" (1976), 10 Canadian Journal of Political Science
605-626
4. Karl A. Friedmann, "The Public and the Ombudsman: Perceptions and
Attitudes in Britain and in Alberta" (1977), 10 Canadian Journal of Political
Science 497-525. See also K. A. Friedmann, Comparative Aspects of Complaint
Behavior and Attitudes Toward Complaining in Canada and Britain (Vol. 2, Sage
Professional Papers, Administrative and Policy Studies Series, 03-019)
5. M. A. Schwartz, Politics and Territory: The Sociology of Regional Persistence
in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974) at chap. 6
6. To add a historical dimension, in a lighter vein, one should read the hilarious
account of 19th century election politics by Addison Bown: "Old Time Politics in
Newfoundland" (Lecture to the Newfoundland Historical Society, June 3, 1970).
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by personal observations. Partisan conflict has had a bearing on the
development of both Ombudsman offices considered in this paper.
I. The Politics ofAdoption
The Ombudsman idea has gained broad exposure in Canada since
1961. The Nova Scotia Legislature was the first in the country to
commission a feasibility study, in 1964. The Committee, consisting
of one Liberal and six Conservative MLAs, took less than four
weeks to reject the idea. They feared that a "process of erosion"
would adversely affect the "intimate contact between the legislator
and his constituents" and lessen the "frequency of contact"
between MLAs and Ministers. 7 In other words, MLAs' stock-in-
trade, constituency work, would face stiff competition from an
Ombudsman. The Committee preferred to increase MLAs' expense
allowances instead. In 1967, Alberta and New Brunswick
established Ombudsman offices. Quebec enacted Ombudsman
legislation in 1968, and Manitoba gave it serious thought. In
February 1969, the Conservative government of Nova Scotia
established a second Select Committee of the Legislature to
consider "an Ombudsman Type of Official for Nova Scotia". The
Committee heard submissions from the New Brunswick Ombuds-
man and many others, of which all but one were in favour of such an
appointment. 8 Interviewing the chairman of the Committee in 1969,
I gained the distinct impression that the Committee had more or less
been told to come up with a positive recommendation this time.
They did so in February 1970, leaving the government to decide the
timing. After coming to power late in 1970, the new Liberal
government quickly passed an Ombudsman Act as one of its
election priorities. The office opened for business in September
1971 as the fifth provincial Ombudsman. 9 Quebec and Manitoba
established theirs in 1969.
The typescript is to be found in the Newfoundland collection of Memorial
University Library.
7. Report of the Select Committee to consider "Ombudsman" Type of Official for
Province of Nova Scotia, Tabled March 13, 1964 at 12. Typescript in Nova Scotia
Legislative Library.
8. A former MLA who had been on the 1964 Committee was still opposed to the
idea and his explanation is interesting: "The particular nature of the political
system in Nova Scotia with its hidebound, rigid party politics would prevent the
Ombudsman from fulfilling his role as an unbiased observer and that his decisions
would not bear any real authority." Quoted from T. J. McBride, infra, note 9
9. A more elaborate account of these events and an assessment of the first three
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In December 1966, the House of Assembly of Newfoundland
established a Select Committee to consider the need for an
Ombudsman. The Committee took little over two years to complete
its report, which strongly recommended the appointment of an
Ombudsman. '0 A bill was drafted and passed in June 1970, entitled
"The Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act". For the
next five years, the government refrained from proclaiming the Act
or appointing an Ombudsman. In 1975, the Moores government
finally appointed an Ombudsman. The Premier's choice was highly
controversial.
II. Starting Problems
In contrast to other provinces, both the Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland Ombudsmen have experienced very stormy rites of
passage, for similar reasons. In the first month of operations, a
specific case led to an altercation between the Nova Scotia
Ombudsman and a Minister, at the latter's instigation. The
following is a brief summary of the events: a truck driver
complained to the Ombudsman, Dr. Smith, that he had been
dismissed from his job with the Department of Highways. The
Ombudsman began the investigation by sending the complaint to the
Deputy Minister for comment. Without first sounding out the
Ombudsman, the Deputy Minister presently informed Dr. Smith
that the truck driver could have his job back. Dr. Smith informed
the complainant. A few days later, the Minister of Highways issued
an announcement that the truck driver would not be rehired, adding
that a departmental inquiry had found that "the right decision was to
fire him". It appeared to the public that the Minister had
"overruled" the Ombudsman. A brouhaha soon engulfed the case.
Dr. Smith accused the Minister of undermining public confidence in
the Ombudsman's office. The Opposition claimed that the Minister
had undermined the Ombudsman institution, converting it into a
showy frill. The Attorney General opined sagaciously that the
Ombudsman had "no power to override the decisions of cabinet
ministers". The Leader of the Opposition challenged the Premier
either to clarify the Ombudsman's powers or to "vacate the office
instead of making it a sham". The Premier did neither. The truck
years of the Nova Scotia office are contained in T. J. McBride, "The Nova Scotia
Ombudsman" (1975), 2 DaI.L.J. 182-200
10. Report of the Select Committee on the Appointment of an Ombudsman,
Province of Newfoundland, 1969
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driver did not regain his job, and the Ombudsman did not undertake
to see if the complaint was indeed justified, or that the "second
firing" was in accordance with the law and with sound
administrative practice. Dr. Smith did not resign, although he
seriously considered it.
What was the upshot of the controversy? It created a lasting
impression among the media and the public that the Ombudsman
was not very effective. For two successive years, the rate of
petitioning complaints received by the Ombudsman fell off by more
than 50%. 11 Dr. Smith's relationship with provincial politicians
remains strained.12
The starting problems in Newfoundland also revolved around
party politics. In May 1975, the Conservative Premier, Mr.
Moores, nominated Mr. Ambrose Peddle, a former Conservative
MLA and MP, for the position of Parliamentary Commissioner. The
Leader of the Opposition denounced the choice as "a filthy act of
political patronage", and made it an issue in the Assembly. The
government refused to bend to Opposition pressure. After a recess,
"to cool tempers", the Opposition Leader voted in favour of Mr.
Peddle's appointment. It is difficult to assess the damage inflicted
on the Parliamentary Commissioner institution by this episode. Mr.
Peddle has tried hard not to let it affect his work, but my interviews
in Newfoundland indicate that the matter was still sensitive two
years later.
III. Defining the Ombudsman
I need not review the entire lexicon of scholarly efforts to define the
Ombudsman,' 3 Professor Larry B. Hill has developed a com-
11. In 1971 there were 86 complaints per 100,000 population; in 1972 only 37
complaints and in 1973 about 42 complaints per 100,000 population. In 1974 the
office changed its reporting practice and a reliable comparison with the earlier years
is not possible.
12. In his very report to the Assembly he lectures MLAs on the so-called
non-political nature of the Ombudsman. One gets the impression - from reading
the 1975 Report of the Ombudsman - that politicians in Nova Scotia are a
particularly bad lot: always engaging in "political interference" and taking
"political advantage" of the Ombudsman (1975 Report at 7-8). Dr. Smith has also
vowed to stay away from complaints with "political" overtones.
13. Earlier contributions were made by D. C. Rowat, supra, note I at XXIV; S. V.
Anderson, Ombudsman Papers, American Experience and Proposals (Berkeley:
Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1969) at 3; Gellhorn,
supra, note I at 420-439; W. B. Gwyn, "Transferring the Ombudsman" in S. V.
Anderson, ed., Ombudsmen for American Government (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968) at 38-49
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prehensive definition which enumerates the structural and func-
tional characteristics of the institution:
The classical ombudsman is 1) legally established, 2) function-
ally autonomous, 3) external to the administration, 4) operation-
ally independent of both the legislature and the executive, 5)
specialist, 6) expert, 7) nonpartisan, 8) normatively universalis-
tic, 9) client-centered but not antiadministration, 10) both
popularly accessible and visible. The institution's mission is to
generate complaints against government administration, to use its
extensive powers of investigation in performing a post-decision
administrative audit, to form judgments that criticize or vindicate
administrators, and to report publicly its findings and recommen-
dations but not to change administrative decision. 14
Some of the structural characteristics require further explanation,
which Professor Hill's forthcoming book' 5 provides.1 6 "Function-
ally autonomous" designates the Ombudsman as an independent
organization in its own right; the staff may be small but the
Ombudsman office is not an appendage of a larger organization.
"Operationally independent of both the legislature and the
executive" makes the important distinction between statutory
establishment and legislative selection of the office-holder, and the
Ombudsman's ability to conduct the office without interference
from the legislature or the executive. Professor Hill emphasizes that
the legislative connection per se does not guarantee the
Ombudsman's independence, even from the executive, due to
executive control over the legislature in most contemporary
Parliamentary regimes. The Obmudsman's duty to report to the
legislature is not a ritual expression of his subordinate status, but an
excellent opportunity to publicize his findings and recommenda-
tions. De facto independence is crucial to the Ombudsman in
performing the functions assigned to him by a constitution or a
statute.
Ombudsmanship is a full-time occupation ("specialist").
Ombudsmen become experts in sound administrative practice. They
and their staffs are experienced professionals. The Ombudsman's
selection usually is the product of party consensus. The office's
operating procedures are rigorously non-partisan and impartial,
14. L. B. Hill, supra, note 1 at 12
15. L. B. Hill, Ombudsmen, Bureaucracy and Democracy (forthcoming from
Oxford University Press)
16. I wish to express my appreciation for Professor Hill's permission to quote from
an earlier manuscript of his forthcoming book.
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unbiased and non-discriminatory. Ombudsmen operate on rational-
legal principles ("normatively universalistic").
The functions performed by the Ombudsman are quite
straightforward but often misunderstood. The Ombudsman facili-
tates the lodging of citizen complaints against public administration.
This phrase is preferable to Hill's "generate complaints", which
suggests that the Ombudsman brings complaints into being. The
term, "generate" is quite appropriate when the Ombudsman
investigates a complaint at his own initiative, a right which exists in
most jurisdictions but is infrequently used, except in Sweden.
Ombudsmen have been granted broad powers of investigation
and rights of access to government officials and their files. These
powers are used to audit administrative decisions, which may either
be upheld or criticized. If the latter, the Ombudsman usually seeks
corrective action and may recommend that the original decision be
reversed or modified. He may not impose any change on an
administrator. Many people - including complainants and civil
servants - mistakenly believe that the Ombudsman does have, or
should have such a power. However, that premise, if accepted,
would transform the Ombudsman into a different kind of institution,
a kind of super-decision-maker, and his value as an impartial
investigator would be lost. The Ombudsman may disclose his
findings and recommendations to the media, the legislature and the
public.
It has been argued that, in addition to his specific investigative
functions, the Ombudsman also has more general functions, such as
to reform public administration and to lessen alienation from
government. Whether or not actual Ombudsmen see these functions
as part of their role and seek actively to pursue them must be
determined empirically.
IV. Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Ombudsman
As stated above, I did complete a survey of politicians and
bureaucrats in each province. The questionnaire for bureaucrats was
more lengthy and detailed than that for politicians. The major topics
covered in the surveys were: perception about functions, knowledge
and beliefs about the Ombudsman, attitudes towards the Ombuds-
man, and evaluations of his performance.
Table I shows the samples and returns. Every MLA received a
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questionnaire. 17 The bureaucracy sample consists of all upper level
administrators: Deputy Ministers, Assistant or Associate Deputy
Ministers, Executive Directors, Directors, some Department Heads
and a small number of chairmen of provincial boards and
commissions. My earlier survey of the bureaucracy in Alberta' 8 led
me to include only the bureaucratic elite.
1. Perception of Ombudsman Functions
Both groups of respondents were asked to rank five functions in
order of importance from a list of nine function statements drawn
from the literature and the responses to an open-ended item in the
Alberta bureaucracy survey in 1971. To quantify the results of over
1500 possible individual responses, I adopted a simple weighting
procedure.' 9 The rankings shown in Table 2 show the aggregate
"opinion" of each of the four samples on the functions of the
Ombudsman.
Table 1
Survey Samples and Returns
MLA Public Service
Province Sample Returns Sample Returns
N N % N N %
Newfoundland 48 31 65 183 130 71
Nova Scotia 45 22 49 214 140 65
MLAs and bureaucrats both see the Ombudsman's primary role
as a redresser of individual complaints. "Putting a human face" on
bureaucracy came second. The samples' insistence that the citizen
exhaust all traditional avenues of appeal before resorting to the
Ombudsman may be defensible in principle, but makes little sense
17. The higher return from Newfoundland is probably attributable to the fact that
90% of the questionnaires were handed to MLAs personally with an explanation by
the author while the Assembly was in session in June 1977. In Nova Scotia the
questionnaires had to be mailed while the House was not in session.
18. K. A. Friedmann, "Controlling Bureaucracy: Attitudes in the Alberta Public
Service towards the Ombudsman" (1976), 19 Canadian Public Administration
51-87
19. The lowest (fifth) ranked statement was given one point, the fourth ranked 2
points etc. up to the first ranked statement: 5 points. All the points given by each of
the 4 groups were summed to arrive at one group ranking (e.g. MLAs-Nfld.) for
each statement.
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from a practical point of view. It reveals a desire to impose a serious
limitation on the scope of the Ombudsman's intervention: he must
not short-circuit or upstage existing appeal mechanisms to
Departments, Ministers or MLAs. The low ranking of the general
administrative reform function is surprising too, partly because it is
deemed to be very significant in the theoretical literature, and partly
because the response seems to call into question some of the more
significant activities of the Ombudsman.
Table 2
Ranking of Nine Ombudsman Functions
(MLA and Public Service) by Province
Rank
MLAs Public Service
Nfld. N.S. Nlfd. N.S.
To right individual wrongs 1 1 1 1
To make bureaucracy more humane 3 2 2 2
To act as a last recourse when all other
avenues have been tried 2 3 3 4
To increase citizens' confidence in
public administration 6 6 4 3
To help the poor, underprivileged, etc. citizen 4 4 6 6
To induce public servants to exercise
more care in dealing with the public 5 5 5 5
To lessen popular alienation from government 7 8 8 7
To reform and improve public administration 9 7 7 8
To vindicate public servants when they
are unjustly accused 8 9 9 9
It is difficult to gauge the extent to which these perceptions
express the respondents' beliefs about what the Ombudsman is, or
what the Ombudsman ought to be. To the extent that they express
factual beliefs, the response tends to show that particular
Ombudsmen may emphasize one function over another. To the
extent that they express normative beliefs, the responses show the
fragility of the legitimacy of the general reform function of the
Ombudsman, which could limit his utility in the political system.
The public service samples were also asked to describe, in their
own words, the "greatest advantage" and "greatest disadvantage"
of the Ombudsman idea. Tables 3A and 3B display the results.
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Bureaucrats clearly see the citizenry as the main beneficiary of the
institution, which provides an additional, objective, non-partisan
external review mechanism. Table 3B also shows that bureaucrats
are critical of the public for abusing the Ombudsman by
complaining about trivial matters or skipping regular appeal
channels (items 1 and 4). Items 5 and 6 embody suggestions for
making the Ombudsman more effective and relevant, while items 2,
3, 7 and 8 indicate some dissatisfaction with the operation of the
office or the incumbent. The perceived advantages outweigh
perceived disadvantages roughly by a two-to-one ratio, if one
reverses the direction of items 5 and 6 in Table 3B.
2. Beliefs about the Ombudsman in the Public Service
Public service respondents alone were asked about their knowledge
of the Ombudsman as a person and an institution. The response
(Table 4) was weak and patchy. Affective responses, items 2 and 6,
comprise about one third of all answers. The ratio of statements of
praise to statements of criticism is three or four to one, which is an
indication of favourable beliefs about the offices and/or the
incumbents.
3. Attitudes towards the Ombudsman
Politicians and civil servants were both asked in several direct
questions about their attitudes towards the Ombudsman. We will
Table 3A
Greatest Advantage of the Ombudsman Idea
(Public Service) by Province
Nfld. N.S.
1. Impartial, non-political, objective review 21 24
2. Justice and fair play for the public 32 15
3. New (additional) channel of complaint 14 21
4. Controls bad administr'ation 12 13
5. A last resort (recourse) 10 8
6. To help people 2 11
7. Redress for the underprivileged 4 6
8. Other 5 2
Totals 100% 100%
(N) (92) (115)
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Table 3B
Greatest Disadvantage of the Ombudsman Idea
(Public Service) by Province
Nfld. N.S.
1. Easy to abuse, petty complaints 25 24
2. Criticism of operation (of present office) 13 18
3. (Serious) adverse consequences for public
administration 13 11
4. Creates false expectations, confusion 9 13
5. Lack of power/jurisdiction/or resources 9 13
6. Political interference/political appointment 10 4
7. Too much power/one individual too powerful 6 2
8. Criticism of incumbent or his background 4 1




Information on Person/Institution of
Ombudsman (Public Service) by Province
Nfld. N.S.
First Second First Second
Response Response
1. Not much, nothing, forgot 32 3 22 0
2. Praise of incumbent or operation 22 31 27 30
3. Structural/operational information 12 13 20 15
4. Background of incumbent 13 6 10 23
5. Name of incumbent 6 0 11 7
6. Criticism of incumbent/operation 7 41 6 15
7. Met him, heard speech, saw on TV 6 3 1 3
8. Specific case reference 2 3 1 5
9. Other 0 0 2 3
Totals 100% 100% 100% 101%
(N) (90) (32) (110) (40)
review these briefly before considering a more indirect measure of
attitude.
Tables 5 and 6 show that bureaucrats in both provinces are
overwhelmingly in favour of the idea of an Ombudsman, and the
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need for an Ombudsman in their jurisdictions. Although a majority
of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland MLAs concurred, a substantial
minority expressed reservations or doubts. This phenomenon was
particularly noticeable in Nova Scotia. None of the respondents
chose "strong disapproval", however. Table 7 shows that there
were no statistically significant differences between Government
and Opposition parties in Newfoundland. There were, however,
significant differences between Government and Opposition parties
in Nova Scotia; the governing Liberals tended to express approval
of the Ombudsman idea more often and more emphatically than the
opposition Conservatives. Personal interviews which I conducted in
1976 show that a portion of New Democrat objections were based
on their initial unfavourable impression of the handling of the truck
driver case, which persisted six years later.
Table 8 demonstrates that personal acquaintance with the
Ombudsman tends to be associated with greater acceptance of the
idea. There are also signs that approval increased as contact with the
Ombudsman became more personal and intensive.
MLAs and bureaucrats were asked to evaluate their Ombudsman
by the question, "What general impression have you gained of the
Ombudsman (work, performance, approach, etc.)?" Table 9
displays the response. The Nova Scotia bureaucracy rated the
Ombudsman higher than its Newfoundland counterpart, although
Nova Scotia politicians rated the Ombudsman somewhat lower than
Table 5
Approval of Ombudsman Idea (MLAs
and Public Service) by Province
MLAs Public Service
Nfld. N.S. Nfld. N.S.
Approve Strongly 50 18 23 30
Approve 30 50 68 62
Uncertain 20 9 8 6
Disapprovea 0 23 2 1
Totalsb 100% 100% 101% 99%
(N) (30) (22) (119) (140)
am "Disapprove strongly" response was, of course, provided in the questionnaire
but not one respondent chose it.
bBecause of rounding totals will be more or less than 100%.
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Table 6
Need for Ombudsman
(MLAs and Public Service) by Province
MLAs Public Service
Nfld. N.S. Nfld. N.S.
Definitely Yes 36 24 20 24
Yes 48 38 64 63
Uncertain 13 14 14 10
Noa 3 24 3 3
Totals 100% 100% 101% 100%
(N) (31) (21) (118) (140)
'No respondent chose "Definitely No".
their Newfoundland colleagues. This result is a little surprising; I
thought the more recent controversy over Mr. Peddle's appointment
would have affected Newfoundland MLAs' response more strongly
than it apparently did.
Table 10 shows that Opposition MLAs in both legislatures were
significantly less favourable in evaluating the Ombudsman than
Government MLAs. MLAs who knew the Ombudsman personally
also tended to be more favourable (see also Table 10). Civil servants
who knew the Ombudsman, and those who have had more intense
or more frequent contact with him, have shown the same tendency
(see Table 11).
The civil service was asked, in very general and subjective terms,
about its "fear" and "respect" of the Ombudsman. 2 0 Tables 12
and 13 present the response. Table 12 shows a virtually identical
response pattern on the question of "fear" for both provinces.
2 1
The response on "respect" follows the known evaluative pattern in
the public service: the Nova Scotia office rates somewhat higher
than the younger Newfoundland office. Should an administrator live
in fear of an Ombudsman? There are at least three cases in which he
should: (1) if the official's conduct is below par; (2) if the
Ombudsman is arbitrary, unpredictable or unjust; and (3) if the
20. "It may be difficult to assess this, but assuming you had to form a judgment on
administrators' attitudes towards your Ombudsman, how would you rate their fear
of and respect for the Ombudsman - taking a general view of your colleagues?"
21. A preliminary analysis of the Ontario public service response on this question
showed a significantly higher level of "fear".
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Table 9
General Impression of Ombudsman's Performance
(MLAs and Public Service) by Province
MLAs Public Service
Nfld. N.S. Nfld. N.S.
Highly positive 19 14 5 18
Generally positive 45 48 51 64
Uncertain 26 14 39 16
Generally negative 7 24 4 2
Highly negative 3 0 1 0
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N) (31) (21) (118) (137)
Ombudsman sets very exacting standards of conduct. These data do
not enable us to distinguish what "fear" or "fears" we are dealing
with here. To obtain a more detailed response pattern, the civil
service were asked, open-endedly, what they would praise or
criticize most in the Ombudsman's performance. Tables 14 and 15
summarize the response. The weak response came as a surprise:
24% of Newfoundland respondents and 54% of Nova Scotia
respondents offered an item of praise, while only 26% of
Newfoundland respondents and 28% of Nova Scotia respondents
offered some criticism. 22 Over half of the "critical" responses
(Table 15, items 1 and 5) encouraged the incumbent to publicize the
office or advocated increasing its powers, hence must be interpreted
as support for the institution. The residual body of criticism levels
the charge of superficiality in investigations. Fairness, sincerity and
thoroughness are the main items of praise among civil servants in
both provinces.
One last evaluative question put to both MLAs and bureaucrats
should be noted. Two questions were asked in conjunction, but the
responses were recorded separately:
Do you feel that the Ombudsman's office has now become an
effective institution? And does it matter much who is the
Ombudsman at any one time?
22. The low level of the response is partly explained by the fact that a large number
of respondents had used an earlier question to volunteer (mostly) praise and (some)
criticism (see Table 4). Praise and criticism was coded in the present question only
if it was listed specifically or where an express cross-reference was made to the
earlier response.
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Table 11
Evaluation of Ombudsman Performance (Public Service)
by Acquaintance with Incumbent by Province
Nfld.a N.S.b
General Impression Know Incumbent Know Incumbent
Yes No Yes No
Highly Positive 7 5 30 9
Generally Positive 73 43 62 65
Uncertain 20 46 7 23
Negative 0 7 2 3
Totals 100% 101% 101% 100%
(N) (30) (88) (60) (77)
aKendall's Tau B: .26 (sig. at .001)
bKendall's Tau B: .29 (sig. at .0001)
Table 12
Administrators' Fear of the Ombudsman
(Public Service) by Province
Nfld. N.S.
None at all 28 31
Very little 48 46
Some 21 23




Administrators' Respect for Ombudsman
(Public Service) by Province
Nfld. N.S.
A great deal 8 23
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Table 14
Praise for Ombudsman (Public Service)
by Province
Nfld. N.S.
First Second First Second
Response Response
1. Fair, impartial, objective 32 25 42 16
2. Integrity, sincerity, dedication 15 25 16 11
3. Thorough, efficient, effective 17 0 7 32
4. Competent, good decisions, good job 10 25 9 16
5. Helped people 10 13 7 5
6. Determination, Independence 2 0 5 21
7. Likes person or background 2 0 1 0
8. General function - acceptance 1 0 1 0
9. Other 10 13 12 0
Totals 99% 101% 100% 101%
(N) (41) (8) (76) (19)
Table 15
Criticism of Ombudsman (Public Service)
by Province
Nfld. N.S.
First Second First Second
Response Response
1. Not enough P.R., low profile 50 33 33 0
2. Unfair, biased towards complainant 0 0 0 17
3. Superficial, inefficient, ineffective 9 17 30 17
4. Dislikes person or background 19 50 5 0
5. Not enough power, lacks jurisdiction 6 0 15 0
6. Incompetent, bad decisions 6 0 3 0
7. Rigid, legalistic approach, stubborn 3 0 3 33
8. Other 6 0 12 33
Totals 99% 100% 101% 100%
(N) (32) (6) (40) (6)
Some 75% of both MLAs and bureaucrats felt that the
office-holder mattered very much; personal knowledge of the
Ombudsman made no difference. This response means that,
regardless of who the office-holder is, the individual will always be
very significant.
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Table 16 lists the responses to the first part of the question,
whether the Ombudsman has become an effective institution. There
is an interesting disparity in responses between the two provinces:
the Nova Scotia bureaucracy rates the effective institutionalization
of the Ombudsman higher than the politicians; vice-versa in
Newfoundland.
V. Opinion Statements and Attitude Scales
Both sets of questionnaires contained a series of statements
expressing a wide range of effects which the Ombudsman allegedly
has on public administration, clients, etc. The responses were
intended to be used for Lickert and Guttman-type attitudinal scales,
analysis of which is still incomplete. Table 17 lists a sample of such
statements and the responses obtained. I have made this selection in
order to round out information on the relevance of partisan conflict
in the political culture to the emergent Ombudsman institution. The
Table 16
Ombudsman As Effective Institution
(MLAs and Public Service) by Province
MLAs Public Service
Nfld. N.S. Nfld. N.S.
Very Effective 3 5 0 8
Effective 67 57 49 63
Uncertain 20 14 48 27
Ineffective 7 24 2 1
Very Ineffective 3 0 2 1
Totals 100% 100% 101% 100%
(N) (30) (21) (117) (139)
last three statements listed in Table 17 tap issues raised in the short
history of both Ombudsman institutions. Only item 4 among MLAs
produced a statistically significant difference.23 This is apparently
the residue of the perennial debate in Nova Scotia about the relative
merits of an institutional Ombudsman versus the MLA as a
constituency Ombudsman, which led to the initial rejection of the
Ombudsman concept in 1964. It still appears to be an banner around
which opposition to the Ombudsman rallies.
23. Kendall's Tau B: .44 (sig. at .0006).
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Table 18
Attitude Scale (MLA and Public Service) by Province
MLAs Public Service
Nfld. N.S. Nfld. N.S.
Low - favourable 13 9 12 7
Low - medium 19 23 43 32
Medium - high 52 50 37 52
High - favourable 16 18 9 9
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N) (31) (22) (120) (140)
The lack of a significant difference of opinion on the fifth and
sixth statements of Table 17 is also noteworthy.
I constructed an experimental Guttman-type scale based on
twelve opinion statements for MLAs and ten for the civil service. 
24
Table 18 displays the results. MLAs are slightly more supportive
than civil servants. The Nova Scotia civil service is somewhat more
supportive than its Newfoundland counterpart. The scale shows a
much more highly dispersed attitude pattern in all four groups than
the responses to the direct questions in Tables 5, 6 and 9 would lead
one to expect.
VI. Conclusions
It is much too optimistic to expect Ombudsman organizations to
become institutionalized in Huntingdon's sense within two years or
even six. We are dealing with a process, i.e. an organization
gradually becomes more accepted and influential in its political
environment. Both provincial Ombudsmen were confronted with
serious initial challenges from external sources from which neither
has fully recovered. Partisan politicians in both provinces saddled
the Ombudsmen with onerous problems of credibility, authority and
status.
The problems facing the two Ombudsmen are similar, but not
identical. It should be easier to find solutions in Newfoundland than
24. The scoring technique is as follows: for every item (statement) "passed" (i.e.
showing a positive, favourable attitude towards the Ombudsman) a respondent
received one point. Points for ten/twelve items were summed and grouped in 4
categories, as shown in Table 18. The scale is really a cumulative scale, utilizing,
however, Guttman-type scoring.
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in Nova Scotia. In Newfoundland, MLAs are more agreed about the
basic premises of the Ombudsman concept than in Nova Scotia. The
only impediment to party consensus on the office concerned the
partisan background of the Premier's choice. The Opposition
remains concerned about Mr. Peddle's performance; if Mr. Peddle
can convince the Opposition of his vigorous impartiality, it would
remove the only serious barrier to institutionalization. A change of
government might achieve the same result.
Doubts about the need for an Ombudsman lingered among Nova
Scotia MLAs long after they had established the office. These
doubts persisted among a substantial minority of MLAs who eyed
the Ombudsman warily as a competitor for their constituents'
loyalties and affection. The Ombudsman's initial unsuccessful
showdown with the government caused some MLAs who were
originally in favour of the concept to see some of its limitations,
particularly its lack of authority. Lacking real authority, they argue,
the Ombudsman can only act as a government apologist, hardly a
state of affairs which the Opposition would support. I am
pessimistic about the prospects for resolving this dilemma in the
short run owing to the apprehensive attitudes among many MLAs
for as long as six years. In the long run, changes in personnel may
help solve this problem, but the process of gaining influence and
credibility may be further delayed.
